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Abstract
We use a ‘multi-player dictator game’ (MDG), with ‘social information’ about the monetary
transfer made by a previous dictator to a recipient, to examine whether average contribu-
tions as well as the behavioural strategy adopted are affected by the first amount presented
(the ‘anchor’) using a sequential strategy elicitation method. We find that average contribu-
tions are positively affected by the anchor. The anchor is also found to influence the beha-
vioural strategy that individuals adopt, such that low anchors significantly increase the
likelihood that players will adopt unconditional self-interested strategies, whereas high
anchors increase the likelihood of adopting giving strategies. The distribution of strategies–
and hence, the distribution of behavioural ‘types’—is therefore affected by the initial condi-
tions of play, lending support to the notion that behavioural strategies are context
dependent.
Introduction
This paper reports results of an experiment that examines the impact of an initial piece of
information—or ‘anchor’—on redistribution choices in response to social information.
Anchoring is a well-established cognitive phenomenon describing the tendency of individ-
uals to make judgments that are biased towards the first piece of information they receive
[1,2]. Most anchoring studies examine the impact of anchors on numerical judgments (e.g.
[1]), beliefs (e.g. [3,4]), and elicited preferences (e.g. [5]). Anchors are also found to affect
actual behaviour, including consumer bidding in auctions (e.g. [6, 7, 8]), consumer purchases
[9], and valuations of consumer goods with probabilistically binding choices (e.g. [10, 11])
although Fudenberg et al (2012) [12] do not replicate the findings in [11].
There has been much less research on the effects of anchors on pro-social behaviour, such
as cooperation and redistribution, and what little evidence there is, is mixed. For example,
Cappelletti, Gu¨th, & Ploner, M. (2011) [13] and Luccasen (2012) [14] both fail to find evidence
of anchoring effects on cooperation behaviour using public goods games, whereas Fosgaard &
Piovesan (2015) [15] find that subjects playing a public goods game with default options
(using the strategy method) anchor their subsequent decisions to the default. The evidence is
similarly inconclusive with respect to anchoring effects on redistribution behaviour. Raihani &
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McAuliffe (2014) [16] find that numerical anchors (based on player’s ages) have no effect on
monetary transfers in a dictator game–although we note that the treatments analysed for
anchoring in [16] were intended as control treatments and were not designed to elicit an
anchoring effect. On the other hand, Dhingra et al (2012) [17] find evidence that choices in a
dictator game with default options are anchored to the defaults; they term this a “default pull”
although it corresponds essentially to an anchoring effect.
We aim to add to this limited literature, by asking the following questions: firstly, can an
initial piece of information alter the amount that an individual redistributes? By ‘redistribu-
tion’, we refer to decisions to share wealth with others, with no expectation or possibility of
benefitting materially from redistribution. Secondly, if anchors do affect the amount that indi-
viduals redistribute, might they also affect how the individual perceives the situation and
hence, their behavioural strategy?
The behavioural strategies that people adopt in economic experiments are often used to clas-
sify people into social ‘types’, such as ‘conditional co-operators’ or ‘free riders’ (e.g. [18, 19]).
The general understanding is that these different behavioural strategies reflect underlying social
preferences, such as ‘altruism’, ‘reciprocity’ or ‘warm glow’. For example, redistribution behav-
iour in economic experiments is often considered indicative of altruistic preferences [20], while
contributions to the public good are considered to reflect reciprocity or conformity [21].
However, a growing number of studies are finding that the specific behavioural strategies that
individuals adopt—and hence the distribution of ‘types’–are susceptible to contextual factors,
such as the frame (e.g. [22]), and how choices are elicited (e.g. [23,15]). For example, Dariel
(2018) [23] find that changing the way in which conditional strategies are elicited in a public
goods game radically changes the proportions of conditional co-operators and free riders. This
suggests that the behavioural strategies that individuals adopt may be context-dependent [24,25].
To address this question, we examine the behavioural strategies that individuals adopt in
response to social information. The effect of social information on redistribution decisions has
been extensively explored (e.g. [26–28]), and the general finding is that on average, people pos-
itively condition the amounts they give to the amounts given by others. However, there is het-
erogeneity in how individuals respond to social information, with some people positively
conditioning their choices to those of others, some negatively conditioning their choices and
others unaffected [29,30]. We ask whether the distribution of behavioural types in this context
is sensitive to anchoring effects. This is exploratory research, and as such, we have no expecta-
tions about the size or direction of anchoring effects on the distribution of ‘types’ in the popu-
lation under study. Our aim is mainly to identify whether the choice of behavioural strategy is
affected by normatively irrelevant contextual factors, such as anchors.
To this end, we use a ‘multi-player dictator game’ (MDG), in which there is a first mover
(FM) who makes an initial visible monetary transfer to recipients in the group, and second
movers (SM) who make transfer choices in response to all possible FM choices using a sequen-
tial strategy method. The strategy method involves players providing contingent responses to a
range of possible actions by a peer. Individual ‘types’ are classified based on the full vector of
responses to FM transfers, as either: ‘conformists’ (positive relationship), ‘compensators’ (neg-
ative relationship), ‘self-interested’ (fixed zero transfer) or ‘unconditional givers’ (fixed positive
transfer) types. The impact of anchors on the distribution of types is ascertained by randomly
presenting different SMs with different starting values in the sequential strategy elicitation
exercise and examining whether this initial amount affects the distribution of SM types. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine anchoring effects using the sequential
strategy method.
Overall, we show evidence of an anchoring effect, with average transfers influenced by the
initial amount that SMs must respond to using the sequential strategy method. We also find
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that anchors affect the distribution of ‘types’, such that the likelihood of choosing an uncondi-
tional self-interested strategy is greater in response to low value anchors than high value
anchors. This suggests that the adoption of self-interested strategies may be at least partly
determined by contextual factors, such as anchors.
We consider this to be an important investigation for various reasons. Firstly, individuals are
regularly faced with new redistribution decisions, for example, in the form of charitable appeals.
If the initial piece of information determines the entire strategies adopted by potential donors,
then it suggests that initial information has an inordinate influence on all the related decisions
that follow. The practical value of this finding is highly significant, as anchoring effects could
potentially be harnessed not only to ‘nudge’ individuals towards single instances of fair sharing,
but towards the adoption of more persistent redistributive behaviour. Additionally, from a the-
oretical perspective, the behavioural strategy that an individual adopts is expected to reflect
preferences. Assuming preferences to be stable and well-defined, if anchors cause a change in
the distribution of behavioural strategies, this may suggest that such strategies (such as ‘self-
interest’ or ‘conformity’) are not fixed and may actually reflect different psychological processes
and motivations interacting with contextual factors, such as anchors [24,25,31].
We note that this study also complements the literature examining ‘default’ effects on redis-
tribution choices. Defaults are pre-determined choices that will be implemented unless an
individual actively changes them [32]. They are related to anchors in that a default option can
also act as an anchor. As noted earlier, Dhingra et al (2012) [17] find evidence of what they
term a “default pull” on choices in a dictator game with default options. Similar findings are
reported in [15 and 23] albeit with respect to cooperation behaviour in a public goods game.
Also related is the literature on ‘reference points’, which people often use to evaluate gains and
losses [33], and which have been found to influence bidding behaviour in auctions (e.g. [6]).
With regards to impacts on redistribution choices, Charite, Fisman & Kuziemko (2015) [34]
find that people’s choices are impacted by other people’s reference points.
This rest of paper is organised as follows: in the next section we present our research ques-
tions and hypotheses. This is followed by the Materials and Methods, after which we present
the Results, and finally, the Discussion and Conclusions.
Identifying anchoring effects
To identify anchoring effects with respect to the initial amount presented to second movers,
the order in which the hypothetical first mover transfers were presented to SMs was random-
ized. Hence, we obtained vectors of responses (SM strategies) for each possible initial amount,
or ‘anchor’ (experimental details are provided in the Experimental Design section). Based on
general findings in the literature on anchoring, we hypothesize that SM transfers will be biased
towards the anchor (e.g. [11]). We do not aim to identify the precise psychological or cognitive
mechanism underlying this anticipated anchoring effect. There are different explanations for
anchoring, including ‘anchoring-and-adjustment’ [1], ‘selective accessibility’ [35,36] and a
close variant of this, ‘query theory’ [37]. The first of these proposes that individuals use the ini-
tial information provided as a starting point (anchor) and reach their final judgment through a
process of marginal but insufficient adjustments from this anchor. ‘Selective accessibility’ and
‘query theory’ models however suggest that when individuals receive an initial piece of infor-
mation, they engage in an internal assessment of the validity of this information. Greater
weight is placed on the initial information provided, resulting in judgments converging on this
initial piece of information.
However, we do not propose to identify whether these (or indeed, other explanations)
explain our findings. The main purpose of the present study is, firstly, to assess whether the
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initial piece of information impacts the redistribution behaviour of individuals in response to
social information; and secondly, to identify whether the behavioural strategy that individuals
adopt are affected by anchors. The first question has only been addressed by two other studies,
as noted in the introduction [16,17]. The second question is novel and has not been addressed
previously.
On the one hand, it is possible that all we observe is a magnitude effect–by which subse-
quent choices are simply adjusted upwards or downwards in response to the initial decision,
but no changes in actual strategy occur. Thus, for example, if this were to occur, players classi-
fied as ‘conformists’ would positively condition their choices to the social information pro-
vided, albeit with an upward (downward) shift in overall transfers in response to a higher
(lower) anchors. Similarly, players classified as ‘compensators’ and ‘unconditional givers’
would be expected to continue behaving in line with their type, but with similar upwards
(downwards) adjustments. Self-interested contributors however would not be expected to
adjust, assuming that they have pure self-interested preferences. On the other hand, it is possi-
ble that the reasoning an individual engages in when faced with different anchors affects how
they perceive the decision, which could potentially lead to changes in adopted strategy. As
noted, this is an exploratory question, and we have no expectations for the pattern of an effect
in this regard.
We also consider it possible that the entire order in which FM transfers are presented to
SMs may have an effect on choices beyond the effect of the initial amount. To assess possible
order effects, we ran a series of tests which are reported in the S1 Appendix. We found no evi-
dence of order effects beyond the impact of the initial amount on SM transfers.
Finally, we acknowledge that there are other contextual factors—such as how the decision is
framed—that may influence decisions. Framing effects occur when information is presented
in different ways, leading to different interpretations of the context and decision. In our study,
it is possible that the first piece of information received (what we term the ‘anchor’) actually
affects choices through a ‘framing effect’–i.e. by changing the perception of what the decision
context involves. This would be in line with the ‘selective accessibility’ and ‘query theory’ mod-
els, which propose heavy reliance on the first piece of information to shape one’s decision–
hence, in this context, the anchoring effect could be akin to a ‘framing effect’ whereby the
frame is provided by the initial information, or ‘anchor’.
Materials and methods
Experimental design
To explore the influence of first mover (FM) monetary transfers on second mover (SM) redis-
tribution behaviour, we used a ‘multi-player dictator game’ (MDG) in which SM’s could con-
dition their choices on the possible choices of a first mover. At the beginning of the game,
participants were randomly assigned to groups of eight players. Within these groups, half of
the players were randomly assigned to the role of allocator (i.e. ‘dictator’) and half to the role
of recipient. Allocators received an endowment of $2 per person; recipients did not receive this
endowment.
The next set of instructions informed allocators that that one of them would be randomly
selected “by the computer” to make the first transfer and that this amount would be communi-
cated to the other allocators in the group. The instructions specifically read:
“the computer will now randomly select one of you to make a transfer before anyone else.
This person will be referred to as the ‘first mover’. The transfer made by the first mover will be
made visible to all the other participants. Please move to the next page to determine whether
you have been selected to be the ‘first mover’”
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When allocators moved to the next page of the experiment, one of them was informed that
s/he had been selected to be the ‘first mover’. The FM was then given the option to transfer
one of the following amounts from their endowment to the recipients: [$0, $0.10, $0.25, $0.50,
$0.75, $1]. These amounts were presented simultaneously on the same page.
Meanwhile, the remaining three allocators moved to another page where they were
informed that they had not been selected to be the first mover. These ‘second movers’ (SMs)
were then informed that the FM had been given the choice of transferring one of the six afore-
mentioned amounts to the recipients. SMs were then asked to indicate how much they would
contribute conditional on each of these possible FM transfers. Fig 1 shows a screenshot of the
page that SMs were presented with, outlining these instructions.
Each possible FM transfer was presented to SM’s sequentially on separate screens, and in
random order–thus implementing our anchoring treatments. SMs indicated their preferred
transfers sequentially in response to each of the six possible FM transfers. Hence, we obtained
vectors of responses (SM strategies) for each of these six possible anchors. Table 1 shows the
sample size for each anchor.
SM transfers were elicited using an open-ended format, such that they could transfer any
amount between $0 and $2. Fig 2 shows a sample screenshot of one of these choices offered to
SMs.
Each time a SM clicked on “Next” after indicating their preferred transfer, a new screen
appeared with another FM transfer. Once the SMs had provided a full vector of responses to
each possible FM transfer, the FM’s choice was communicated to the SMs.
As a side note, we mention that the strategy method is usually used non-sequentially, i.e.
subjects view all possible choices by another subject/other subjects and provide their condi-
tional choices simultaneously. Thus, in the standard approach, subjects make their choices
under a scenario of “advanced disclosure”. Given our interest in identifying whether subjects
Fig 1. Screenshot showing transfer instructions for SMs.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231203.g001
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would anchor their decisions to the first amount they were presented with, we used a sequen-
tial approach. However, to keep our design as close as possible to the standard approach, we
opted for advanced disclosure of the FM’s choices. Only when choices were to be made, was
this done sequentially.
After completing the MDG, allocators (FMs and SMs) were asked to provide an open-
ended explanation for their decision–specifically, the question read: “How did you decide on
the amount that you contributed?” Although this qualitative data lacks the clarity of quantita-
tive measures of social influence on redistribution, it can be used to assess the robustness of
the SM classification process. Participants then indicated how much they expected other SMs
in their group to contribute on average. Finally, they were asked to provide basic socio-eco-
nomic information, including their gender, age and income. We expect that redistribution
behaviour will be positively influenced by female gender (e.g. [38,39]) and income (due to the
income effect).
A custom, web application was used to allow participants to play the game interactively
with the other members of their group at the same time. The web application was developed
specifically for this experiment primarily using the programming languages PHP, HTML, and
Javascript. It was hosted on Amazon EC2 while the experiment was running. This is a fairly
novel development in studies using Mechanical Turk subjects (other examples include [40]).
Typically, group-based studies using MTurk subjects do not provide interactive platforms for
players to play simultaneously with each other. The design in the present study adds realism
and urgency to the player’s actions, which enhances the validity of group-based decisions.
The experimental instructions can be found in the S1 Data under ‘Experimental Instruc-
tions’. In addition, a recording of the interactive platform can be found in the following link:
http://www.columbia.edu/~ms4403/dictator_game/Dictator%20Game%20Screencast.mp4.
Analysis procedure
To identify anchoring effects on conditional transfer amounts, firstly, we compare the overall
contributions by anchor using a Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test, which is a rank-based nonparamet-
ric test used to compare the medians of two or more groups, and is considered the
Table 1. Summary sample size by anchor.
Anchor value (IA) Sample Size
$0 55
$0.10 40
$0.25 60
$0.50 51
$0.75 64
$1 54
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231203.t001
Fig 2. Screenshot example—Elicitation of SM transfer in response to FM transfer of $0.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231203.g002
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nonparametric equivalent of the one-way ANOVA. We use the KW test because our examina-
tion of residuals (using standardised and quantile normal probability plots) suggest the residu-
als are not normally distributed; additionally, the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality confirms
that the raw data is not normally distributed.
Then, given that we have repeated observations (six) per SM, we assume that observations
from the same individual are correlated and hence we opt to use mixed effects regression anal-
yses on the full data set of SM strategy-method transfers, with clustering of standard errors at
the individual level. Mixed effects regression is appropriate to model anchoring effects in
which SMs are treated as random effects; we do not cluster at the group level as there is no
interaction between group members during the strategy data collection stage, so there is no
reason that there should be group-level effects. The regression models include dummies for all
possible anchors (with IA of $0.50 as the reference) so as to identify the specific impacts of
each anchor on transfers and non-linearities. We also run regressions using a dichotomous
version of the anchoring variable (where 1 = IA�$.50 and 0 = IA<$0.50). We tested the
assumption that observations by individual SMs are correlated, as required by mixed effects
models. Estimation of the intraclass correlation (ICC)–which indicates the correlation among
observations within the same ‘level’ (in this case, the ‘individual’)–suggests that approximately
85% of the total residual variance in our dependent variable can be accounted for by clustering
at the individual level. Wald Chi2 tests and likelihood ratio tests comparing the mixed effects
versus linear model confirm that the mixed effects model is suitable for our data.
To identify the impact of anchors on the behavioural strategy that SM’s adopt, we first cate-
gorize SMs by fitting a linear model (using ordinary least squares) predicting the SM strategy
transfer amount by the FM transfer (similar to the approach used in [41,30]). The linear model
fitted for each subject was simply:
transfer amounti ¼ b0 þ b1FM transfer amounti þ �i
FM transfer amounti 2 f0:0; 0:1; 0:25; 0:50; 0:75; 1:0g
The estimated intercept term, β0, and the beta term, β1, were used to categorize SMs into
four main groups (details can be found in Table 2). To explore whether the adoption of differ-
ent strategies is affected by the initial information or ‘anchor’, we conduct a multinomial logis-
tic regression on the different player ‘types’, as well as a binary logistic regression specifically
aimed at addressing whether anchors influence the adoption of a ‘self-interested’ strategy. Our
motivation for focusing on the ‘self-interested’ type is based on our finding that this particular
behavioural strategy appears to be most susceptible to anchors.
As noted earlier, given the focus on this paper on anchoring effects, all results and analyses
in this paper pertain solely to SM decisions elicited using the strategy method. Data on FM
transfers is not analysed here; however, it is available upon request. The analyses in this paper
were conducted using the statistical packages Stata 15 and R.
Table 2. Classification scheme.
Type Classification Quantitative criteria
1 Conformist β1 significantly positive; y-intercept (β0) irrelevant.
2 Compensator β1 significantly negative; β0 irrelevant.
3 Unconditional giver β1 not significant; β0 significantly positive; average transfer>$0.05.
4 Self-interested β1 not significant; β0 not significantly different from zero; average transfer<$0.05
5 All other R2 less than or equal to 0.20
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231203.t002
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Participants
We used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to recruit participants for this experiment.
MTurk experiments generally involve low stakes, as participants play from their computers or
smartphones, which usually takes less than ten minutes. This allows experimenters to decrease
the stakes without compromising the results. This has been confirmed by several studies show-
ing that data collected using MTurk (with low stakes) are of similar quality than those gathered
using the standard laboratory [42,43,44].
Consent was obtained at the beginning of the study; participants read a page of text summa-
rising the study and their rights, and if they consented to participate, they could choose to con-
tinue or discontinue the study. After providing informed consent, participants were presented
with the experimental instructions, followed by two questions testing comprehension. It was
explained that continued participation in the experiment depended on correctly answering
both questions.
Data was collected from a total of 118 groups of subjects, with eight in each group (four
allocators and four recipients). Due to dropouts (n = 39) the final sample consists of 433 allo-
cators (109 FMs, 324 SMs) distributed unevenly among groups. Given the focus on this paper
on anchoring effects, all results and analyses in this paper pertain solely to SM decisions elic-
ited using the strategy method. Additionally, as we are interested in individual SM decisions
rather than aggregate group decisions, we opt to use the full SM dataset rather than exclude
incomplete groups (n = 24 incomplete groups)–we do this because group members did not
interact in any way other than by viewing the FM’s decision, hence dropouts were not
observed by SMs when providing their conditional redistribution choices via the strategy
method. For the final pay outs, we always divided the sum of all transfers made among the
actual number of recipients in the group, regardless of the number of dropouts. The sample
was composed of 43% females; the average age was 33 years and median annual income was
$45,000.
This research was approved by Columbia University’s Internal Review Board, approval
number IRB-AAAM5961.
Results
Overview of data
We start by examining the data at the aggregate level, presenting an overview of social infor-
mation on redistribution decisions. As noted previously, the experiment elicited SM transfers
in response to each of six possible FM transfers that were presented sequentially [$0, $0.10,
$0.25, $0.5, $0.75, $1]. The distribution of SM contributions in response to each possible FM
transfer can be found in S2 Appendix, in addition to a line graph showing mean SM transfers
in response to each of these FM transfers.
Overall, mean SM transfers are found to increase modestly with FM transfers. Results of a
Friedman test (non-parametric equivalent to a repeated measures ANOVA) suggest that FM
transfers have no significant influence on SM transfers overall (Friedman’s χ2 = 8.598,
p = 0.1262; Kendall’s W (effect size = 0.005). However, additional pairwise paired t-tests and
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests between mean SM responses (with Bonferroni
adjustments to account for multiple testing) suggest that there are some significant pairwise
differences in SM transfers in response to some FM transfers. For example, there is a signifi-
cant difference between SM responses to $1 and SM responses to $0, $0.10 and $0.25 (p<0.05
for all tests). Results of these pairwise tests can be found in S3 Appendix.
PLOS ONE Anchors and behaviour
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Anchoring effects on average SM transfers
Fig 3 presents mean SM contributions at each possible FM transfer level disaggregated by IA.
Thus, each line in Fig 3 represents mean SM transfers at each FM transfer level for the different
anchor treatments; for example, the bottom line with triangular markers shows mean contri-
butions at each possible FM transfer level only for SMs who were presented with an IA of
$0.25.
From Fig 3, it appears that mean SM transfers differ by anchor, especially in response to
lower FM transfers. For example, SMs in the $0.25 anchor treatment transfer an average of
$0.18, while SMs in the $0.75 anchor treatment transfer $0.32. To identify whether there is a
statistically significant difference between SM transfers in response to each FM transfer by
anchor, we use a Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test, to compare the medians of the anchoring groups.
Results indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between SM transfers by
anchor treatment in response to FM transfers of $0 (KW: p = 0.0371, η2 = 0.036)) and $0.10
(KW: p = 0.0329, η2 = 0.036)). Anchoring treatments have no statistically significant effect on
average SM transfers in response to FM transfers of $0.25, $0.50, $0.75 and $1. This shows that
anchoring only impacts decisions made in response to selfish FM transfers.
However, it can also be observed that mean SM transfers do not increase linearly with the
size of the anchor. For example, the $0.50 anchor appears to elicit the highest mean transfers
in response to most FM transfer amounts. Interestingly, contributions in response to the most
extreme anchors ($0 and $1) converge in the middle; this suggests that the extreme anchors
may lead to more moderate responses. In their review of anchoring studies, Furnham and Boo
(2011) [45] report mixed findings regarding the impact of extreme anchors, with some studies
finding that extreme anchors generate strong anchoring effects (e.g. [35]) while others find
exactly the opposite (e.g. [46]). Our results agree with the latter findings that extreme anchors
have weaker anchoring effects. There also appears to be a modest interaction between the IA
Fig 3. SM responses to FM transfers disaggregated by initial amount.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231203.g003
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and the FM transfer amount, with the IA of $0.50 leading to a fairly flat relationship between
IA and FM amount while other IAs suggest positive relationships.
To verify if the differences in average responses to FM transfers by anchor are meaningful,
we carry out mixed effects regression analyses on the full data set of individual SM strategy-
method transfers. In the models, we include the FM transfer amounts that SMs provided
responses to, as well as key socio-economic influences on behaviour (age, gender and income).
Additionally, we include a variable representing the order in which FM transfers were pre-
sented (first through sixth), to account for possible effects of time or repetition on stated con-
tributions. Studies have shown [47,48] that individuals playing sequential dictator games
decrease their contributions round by round, hence we wish to control for this possible source
of variation here.
We examine the potential anchoring of transfers to the initial amount (IA) presented to
SMs, using dummies for all possible anchors (with IA of $0.50 as the reference) so as to identify
specific impacts of each anchor on transfers and non-linearities. We also use a dichotomous
version of the anchoring variable (where 1 = IA�$.50 and 0 = IA<$0.50). This reflects the
apparent dichotomised response to the anchors, which we report in the S4 Appendix. Finally,
given the apparent interaction between anchor and FM transfer, we also present models with
interaction effects. Regression results are presented in Table 3. In S5 Appendix, we report
results of similar regressions using only those choices made by SMs in groups without drop-
outs, to assess whether there are systematic differences in results when excluding groups with
dropouts. As noted previously, dropouts were not observed by SMs when providing their con-
ditional redistribution choices hence there should be no effect of dropouts on choices. Results
of these additional regressions confirm that there is no systematic difference in results.
Results in model 1 in Table 3 show that–compared to the reference IA of $0.50 (represent-
ing 25% of the endowment)–IAs (anchors) of $0.10 and $0.25 have negative influences on
overall transfers, whereas IAs over $0.50 (as well as the IA of $0) do not lead to significantly
different SM transfers. In model 2, the dichotomous version of the IA variable has a positive
influence on SM transfers, somewhat confirming results in model 1. In addition, results also
show that SMs appear to condition their contributions positively to those of FM’s. However,
the slope is quite modest: for each unit increase in the FM’s transfer, SMs increase the amount
they transfer by about 5% of the FM’s transfer.
Models 3 and 4 include additional terms for interactions between FM transfer and anchors
(hence allowing for different slopes). Interaction terms in model 3 show that the slopes associ-
ated with anchors of $0.10, $0.25, $0.75 and $1 are positively and significantly different from
the slope for the anchor of $0.50 (although this is only weakly significant for the slopes of
$0.10, $0.25 and $0.75), partly confirming what can be observed in Fig 3. Ex post tests of the
equality of slopes also confirm that all the slopes (except for the slope associated with the
anchor of $0.50) are not significantly different to each other. When modelled as dichotomous
(model 4), there is no interaction effect. This can be observed visually quite clearly in the figure
in the S6 Appendix, which shows SM contributions disaggregated by the dichotomous IA vari-
able. In terms of effect sizes, estimates indicate that the smaller value anchors lead to a reduc-
tion of around $0.10-$0.20 in the average amount transferred by SMs (corresponding to about
10–20% of the fair donation amount of $1), depending on the model specification.
Finally, female gender and age positively influence SM transfers, such that older females
give more. The positive effect of gender on donations has been found in numerous studies
(e.g. [38,39]).
Overall, results indicate that average SM transfers are influenced by the initial FM choice
presented to them using the sequential strategy method, thus indicating the presence of an
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anchoring effect. In addition, the general pattern of SM responses (to the first amount seen
and in response to all possible FM transfers) suggests a positive relationship between FM con-
tributions and SM contributions (which could be indicative of conformity)—although we do
not observe this for the IA of $0.50, for which we observe no relationship between FM and SM
Table 3. Regressions on second mover transfers. The dependent variable is cents transferred per second mover to the recipients. The reference initial amount (IA) level
is $0.50.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IA = $0 -11.092
(7.116)
-14.323�
(7.446)
IA = $0.10 -12.392�
(7.498)
-16.645��
(7.904)
IA = $0.25 -15.420��
(6.719)
-19.021���
(7.077)
IA = $0.75 -3.122
(7.042)
-6.852
(7.319)
IA = $1 -8.165
(7.152)
-13.214�
(7.460)
IA dichotomous (where 1�$0.50, 0<$0.50) 9.284��
(3.861)
9.944��
(4.051)
Order in which FM transfer presented -0.283
(0.200)
-0.283
(0.200)
-0.285
(0.189)
-0.319�
(0.189)
FM transfer (cents) 0.051���
(0.015)
0.051���
(0.015)
-0.026
(0.037)
0.059���
(0.021)
Female 12.999���
(3.977)
12.960���
(3.999)
12.999���
(3.977)
12.960���
(3.999)
Age 0.477���
(0.170)
0.458���
(0.171)
0.477���
(0.170)
0.458���
(0.171)
Income (divided by 1000) -0.084
(0.054)
-0.094�
(0.055)
-0.084
(0.054)
-0.094
(0.055)
Interactions
IA = $0�FM transfer 0.075
(0.051)
IA = $0.10�FM transfer 0.098�
(0.059)
IA = $0.25�FM transfer 0.083�
(0.049)
IA = $0.75�FM transfer 0.086�
(0.051)
IA = $1�FM transfer 0.117��
(0.051)
IA dichotomous�FM transfer -0.015
(0.030)
Constant 19.257��
(8.645)
7.382
(7.522)
22.567��
(8.787)
7.166
(7.581)
Number of observations 1884 1884 1884 1884
Number of groups (i.e. SMs) 313 313 313 313
Wald chi2 56.37��� 55.65��� 62.28��� 56.27���
Likelihood ratio test: mixed versus linear model ��� ��� ��� ���
Missing data from 10 respondents on income, age and gender (refusal to answer)
Standard errors (clustered at individual level) are shown in parentheses,
� p < 0.1,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231203.t003
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contributions. In the following section, we will examine the extent to which the anchor influ-
ences the response strategy selected by individual SM.
Influence of anchor on individual strategies
SMs were categorized by fitting a linear model (using ordinary least squares) predicting the
SM strategy transfer amount by the FM transfer (outlined in the Analysis Procedure section).
After fitting a linear model to the data from each participant we categorized them into four
main groups, as outlined in Table 2. The classification was guided by theoretical expectations
regarding the potential response of individuals to redistribution choices made by others [27].
Briefly, these expectations derive from two broad classes of social preference model; in the first
type of model, contributions by others are perceived as complements to one’s own contribu-
tions due to a desire to conform [49,50]; in the second type of model, contributions by others
are seen as substitutes for one’s contributions because one mainly cares about recipients’ final
earnings [51].
Thus, SMs were classed into four main categories: SMs whose transfers are positively corre-
lated with FM transfers are termed ‘conformists’, whilst those whose transfers are negatively
related to those of FM’s are termed ‘compensators’. We recognize that a positive association
between others and one’s own contributions may be attributed to other motivations, such as
reciprocity, but in this case we are using the definition of conformity as “the act of changing
one’s behaviour to match the responses of others” ([52, p606]). This definition accounts for
any positive conditioning of one’s behaviour on the behaviour of others.
In addition, taking into account that SMs may not condition their responses to FM choices,
SMs may also be ‘self-interested’ (zero contribution over all possible FM transfers) or ‘uncon-
ditional givers’ (positive contribution, no relationship with FM transfers).
The distribution of SM types by each of the six anchors can be found in Table 4. A Pearson
Chi2 test of the difference in proportions confirms that the proportions of SM types differ sig-
nificantly between anchors (p = 0.026). This suggests that there are players whose redistribu-
tion strategies are susceptible to the anchor. Given the small sub-samples of SM types
responding to each anchor, we also present distributions of SM types according to ‘low’ and
‘high’ anchors (Fig 4), where ‘low’ anchors are those IAs that have a value of less than $0.50
and ‘high’ anchors have a value of $0.50 or more. This figure is intended to complement
Table 4 by providing a visual overview of the impact of anchors on the distribution SM types.
Results in Fig 4 clearly show a higher proportion of self-interested players (49.7%) when the
IA is low, compared to the proportion of such players (36%) when the IA is ‘high’; a two-sam-
ple test of proportions indicates that the difference is statistically significant (p = 0.0135). At
the same time, the numbers of conformists, unconditional givers and compensators have
Table 4. Percentage distribution of SM types by anchor.
Initial Amount (anchor)
SM Type $0 $0.10 $0.25 $0.50 $0.75 $1 Overall
Conformists 10.91 17.50 11.67 11.76 18.75 20.37 15.12
Compensators 1.82 7.50 0 15.69 3.13 3.70 4.94
Unconditional givers 23.64 15.00 25.00 29.41 32.81 22.22 25.31
Self-interested 47.27 55.00 48.33 31.37 39.06 37.04 42.59
Other 16.36 5.00 15 11.76 6.25 16.67 12.04
Sample size 55 40 60 51 64 54 324
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231203.t004
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increased marginally and non-significantly (although a Pearson Chi2 test indicates a weakly
significant increase in the proportion of ‘compensators’ (p = 0.061)).
To assess whether the apparent impact of the IA on the likelihood of adopting self-inter-
ested versus all other behavioural strategies can still be observed when controlling for socio-
economic characteristics, we ran a logistic regression on ‘self-interested’ (where 1 = self-inter-
ested player type, and 0 = all other). In Table 5, we report the results of two models, the first
using individual dummies representing the different anchoring amounts (with $0,50 as the ref-
erence) and the dichotomous version of the IA variable (where 1 = IA�$0.50, and 0<$0.50).
Results of additional multinomial regressions on the individual SM types can be found in S7
Appendix, as complements to the logistic regressions in Table 5. We do not present these
results in the main text, as subsample sizes for each player type are below the recommended 10
observations per independent variable [53], leading to potentially biased results. However,
results in the multinomial logit models confirm findings in the logistic regression models.
Results in Model 1 in Table 5 show that—when controlling for the socio-economic charac-
teristics of SMs—the higher anchors (above $0.50) significantly reduce the likelihood of adopt-
ing a self-interested strategy. Model 2 confirms this to be the case, with lower IAs (namely, $0
and $0.10) having a positive effect on the likelihood of self-interested strategies, compared to
the reference of $0.50. This influence of lower anchors appears to be limited to the very lowest
values, as there is no relationship between an IA of $0.25 and the likelihood of adopting a self-
interested strategy.
With regards to socio-economic characteristics, we observe that females are much less likely
to adopt self-interested strategies, compared to all other strategies; this confirms findings that
women are more altruistic (e.g. [39]), and adds to the mixed evidence on how conformity
relates to gender (e.g. [54,55]).
Comment: SM expectations
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that SMs either disregard the potential responses of
other second movers to FM contributions, or expect non-responsive or conformist behaviour
Fig 4. Distribution of SM types by ‘high’ or ‘low’ anchor.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231203.g004
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of other SMs with respect to FM contributions. However, if the expected behaviour of other
SMs is negatively correlated with FM contributions, and if SMs mainly condition their
responses on their expectations on how other SMs will behave, then this could lead to compli-
cations in interpreting SM responses and the classification of redistribution strategies in subse-
quent sections. However, our analysis of expectations shows that–broadly–SMs consider other
SMs to positively condition their contributions to FM contributions. This is true across all SM
types. In other words: all SM types expect other SMs to ‘conform’ to FM contributions, regard-
less of whether this is the strategy they use or not. We also note that if we control for ‘expecta-
tions’ in the regressions in Table 3, results are unchanged with the exception that expectations
are positively and significantly correlated with SM contributions in all models. However, we
do not include these models in the main text because the expectations question was not incen-
tivised. As a result, we cannot be sure whether stated expectations influenced contributions, or
whether players answered the expectations question in such a way to justify the contributions
choices they made in the game. Given this potential problem and the fact that expectations do
not affect other variable influences, we opt to omit the expectations variable from the analyses
presented in this paper (however, they are available upon request).
Discussion & conclusions
In this study, we used a multiplayer dictator game to identify how redistribution behaviour is
influenced by what others do. Specifically, we examined how second movers (SMs) responded
Table 5. Logistic regression models of determinants of ‘self-interested’ SM type.
(1) (2)
IA (anchor) presented to SM (where 1 = IA�$0.50, 0 = IA<0.5) -0.577��
(0.236)
IA = $0 0.709�
(0.416)
IA = $0.10 1.051��
(0.457)
IA = $0.25 0.653
(0.413)
IA = $0.75 0.340
(0.406)
IA = $1 0.208
(0.433)
Income (div by 1000) 0.002
(0.004)
0.002
(0.003)
Age -0.011
(0.011)
-0.011
(0.011)
Female -0.776���
(0.245)
-0.776���
(0.244)
Constant 0.580
(0.444)
-2.165
(0.499)
N 314 314
chi2 19.63��� (d.f. = 4) 321.29��� (d.f = 8)
Standard errors in parentheses;
� p < 0.1,
�� p < 0.05,
��� p < 0.01
a Missing data from 10 respondents on income, age and gender (refusal to answer)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231203.t005
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to contributions by first movers (FMs) to passive recipients, using a strategy game, in which
SMs provided a vector of responses to a range of possible FM decisions, ranging from selfish
(zero contributions by FM) to a fair split (half of the endowment).
We found that at the aggregate level, SM redistribution choices elicited via a sequential
strategy method were positively influenced by the initial amount presented (the anchor). Anal-
ysis of SM redistribution choices thus confirm that SMs condition their transfer amounts on
the initial FM transfer presented to them in the strategy experiment. The size of the effect was
found to be small but meaningful. Specifically, smaller value anchors ($0.00, $0.10, and $0.25)
were estimated to reduce the amount transferred on average by around $0.10–$0.20 (10–20%
of the fair donation amount of $1). While anchoring effects are well-established and have been
extensively documented in the empirical literature (see [45] for a review), there is rather less
evidence of anchoring effects with regards to monetary transfer decisions. The past literature
on anchoring and adjustment has mostly focused on the effect of anchors on judgments,
beliefs, and bids for consumer goods, with only a few studies examining how anchors (or
related concepts, such as defaults) can affect redistribution or ‘fair sharing’ behaviour (e.g.
[16,17]. Hence, our finding that anchoring effects extend to redistribution decisions is an
important contribution to the limited literature. Future studies might explore whether anchors
influence other types of pro-social behaviour, such as cooperation.
We also found that the size of the anchor influenced the distribution of behavioural ‘types’
in our experiment. The impact on the distribution of self-interested individuals appears to be
most evident, with higher anchors leading to significantly fewer self-interested players. This
adds to the literature showing that the distribution of ‘types’ may be context-dependent; our
focus on how anchors in particular influence behavioural strategies is novel and thus a major
contribution.
Overall, these findings imply that ‘types’ may be malleable, and the adoption of a beha-
vioural strategy may be context dependent [24,25]. In particular, we note that self-interested
types become less frequent with higher anchors. This suggests there may not just be of one
‘type’ of self-interested agent. Ubeda (2014) [56] notes that there are two motivations underly-
ing observed self-interested behaviour: on the one hand there is a purely self-interested moti-
vation, in which only one’s earnings influence choices, and on the other hand, there are more
complex, self-serving motivations, in which there is a tension between pure self-interest and
the desire to maintain a positive self-image. An individual of the second type might seek self-
justification for selfish behaviour; this justification may be provided in the form of a low IA
observed during the initial stages of play. However, if the initial conditions of play involve high
anchors, then such a player might struggle to justify a selfish strategy if they also seek to main-
tain a positive self-image.
Indeed, analysis of open-ended explanations (see S8 Appendix) shows that fewer SMs with
self-interested strategies explain their decisions in terms of greed/self-interest under a high
anchor (IA� $0.50) (52.46% of self-interested subsample), compared to a low anchor (66.23%
of self-interested subsample). This difference in proportions however has a small effect
size (h = 0.28) and a test of two proportions indicates this is not statistically significant
(p = 0.1008). However, these findings can be taken as broadly indicating the possibility that
positive self-image is less of a concern among self-interested SMs who received a low anchor.
Further research could examine this apparent switching behaviour among those classed as
having self-interested strategies and confirm whether this is only induced by the size of the
anchor or whether this occurs in response to other factors. Additionally, it would be valuable
to explore in greater detail the cognitive mechanisms underlying self-interested strategies.
We note that Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007) [57] find that initial cooperative disposition is a
good indicator of subsequent behaviour in an experimental setting–in our case we observe
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that initial contextual factors may influence an individual’s initial disposition as well as the
subsequent redistribution strategies of individuals. Thus, not only is individual redistribution
behaviour observed to be path dependent, but initial conditions strongly determine the path. If
this is indeed the case, it suggests a very fruitful avenue for future research, in which the path
dependency of different behaviours in a range of collective decision settings is examined as a
function of the initial conditions of play. The outputs from this research may provide critical
input into the understanding of how people choose to behave, and the types of citizen that
individuals choose to be. It also holds some promise with regards to the potential for self-inter-
ested individuals to be ‘nudged’ towards positive redistribution strategies at critical junctures
in time.
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